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**POLAND:****Prospects for Solidarity**

***Former Solidarity leaders are continuing their efforts to reestablish contact with one another and to devise tactics for overt action.*** [redacted]

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Western journalists report that Lech Walesa met senior leaders and advisers of Solidarity over the weekend in Gdansk to discuss how to revive the movement at the grassroots level. The meeting took place in the church of Walesa's priest, Father Jankowski. Walesa met with some of the same leaders two weeks ago during a workers' pilgrimage to a monastery. [redacted]

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Several leading Solidarity advisers told the US Embassy at the end of last month that they were still evaluating the mood of the country and that it was too early to devise new programs of action. Some of the advisers believe it would be difficult to carry out any program because the remnants of active local chapters of the movement are isolated and often do not coordinate their actions. Others, however, believe the union's very fragmentation protects it from a police crackdown.

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**Comment:** The leadership probably concentrated on how to reestablish a degree of coordination between local Solidarity activists. In addition, it probably debated how the regime would react to their attempts to address church-sponsored worker groups and to petition for the release of activists still in jail. [redacted]

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The movement's chiefs apparently cannot agree on such fundamental questions as whether it should continue its boycott of regime-sponsored unions and worker self-management organizations or whether it should try to penetrate them. Some local Solidarity leaders and their followers have already adopted the latter approach. [redacted]

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The leaders would risk reimprisonment under the terms of the recent amnesty if they were to engage in opposition political activity. The regime may hesitate, however, before responding in a tougher fashion. Rearresting recently released political prisoners would undercut Warsaw's efforts to improve its standing on the eve of a series of high-level visits from West European statesmen. [redacted]

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**TURKEY-IRAQ: Security Concerns**

Turkish Foreign Minister Halefoglu and the Deputy Chief of Staff traveled to Baghdad Sunday for two days of talks with Iraqi leaders.

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Press reports in Turkey indicate that the meetings will focus on border security. They also report that Ankara wants to improve its intelligence along the border and establish buffer zones there.

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**Comment:** Kurdish insurgency has become a serious problem for both governments, and no doubt is the principal matter of discussion. The visit comes at an awkward time for the Iraqis, since they are negotiating a limited form of autonomy for their Kurdish population. The Turks almost certainly will try to undercut such an arrangement because it could encourage similar demands among Turkish Kurds. Nevertheless, Baghdad approved a limited cross-border raid by Turkey in May 1983, and may agree to another.

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**CANADA: Conservatives on Defense**

According to a senior military officer, Prime Minister Mulroney's government is having trouble finding funds to fulfill its campaign promise to improve substantially Canada's defense effort. Mulroney has raised the status of the Defense Minister by elevating him to the inner cabinet and placing him in charge of national emergency planning. The new government also is committed to putting the armed forces back into distinctive service uniforms and bringing the headquarters of the major commands—land, sea, and air—back to Ottawa.

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**Comment:** During the election campaign, the Conservatives promised to raise defense spending and manpower in the armed forces, but continued poor economic performance makes substantial increases unlikely. While Canada has met—and will continue to meet—NATO's 3-percent real defense spending growth goal, the low overall spending level means that any increases the Conservatives are likely to achieve will only marginally improve current capabilities. The elevation of Defense Minister Coates to the senior cabinet committee—making him responsible to the Prime Minister rather than to External Affairs Minister Clark—may reflect not only a desire to give defense a high profile but also to avoid friction between Clark and Coates, who have had strong differences in the past.

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### **JAMAICA: Closure of US Alumina Refinery**

The manager of the ALPART alumina refinery, the largest US investment in Jamaica, has told US Embassy officials that its owners are likely to decide at the end of this month to close down operations. The plant processes more than 15 percent of Jamaica's bauxite production, earns 10 percent of the island's foreign exchange, and employs 1,200 workers. High operating costs have long hurt the profitability of the refinery. Only complete exclusion from the government's bauxite tax could keep the plant open, according to the manager. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** Total relief for ALPART would prompt demands for equal treatment from other local producers and still might not persuade ALPART to maintain production over the longer run. A shutdown of the ALPART refinery would increase pressure to further devalue Jamaica's currency, reduce government revenues, and increase the 30-percent unemployment rate. The gloomy outlook for Jamaica's vital bauxite/alumina industry makes the chances remote that Prime Minister Seaga will decide to call local elections this year. [REDACTED]

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**USSR-US: Imports of US Petroleum Equipment**

A Soviet official has told US businessmen recently that new equipment orders for the Astrakhan, Tenghiz, and Karachaganak "sour" oil and gas projects will be worth about \$1 billion each. According to the US Embassy in Moscow, the Soviet expressed interest in US equipment but considers it risky to order items of US origin. Several US firms that can supply equipment from overseas plants have been contacted, according to the official, but obtaining US engineering technology directly would be more complicated. The official expressed willingness to accept direct bids. Reporting for several months, however, has indicated a general Soviet policy not to accept equipment from US sources. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The US executives had earlier complained that the Soviets would not allow US firms to submit bids as direct contractors on these projects, and the official's statement, even with its qualifications, suggests that equipment from US sources would be acceptable. By using US firms only as subcontractors, Moscow probably believes it can hold the prime contractor responsible for any US export control problems. [REDACTED]

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**JAPAN-NORTH KOREA: Fishery Impasse Resolved**

The signing of a "private," two-year fishery agreement in P'yongyang yesterday paves the way for Tokyo to lift sanctions imposed after the Rangoon assassination attempt. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Japanese press reports suggest removal of the sanctions would be total and could occur as early as next month. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The North's willingness to settle this longstanding issue—the last agreement lapsed in June 1982—is part of a broader effort to improve P'yongyang's image in the West and will strike a responsive chord in Tokyo. A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official is scheduled to visit Seoul next weekend and probably will explain that relaxing the ban on official contacts simply returns Japan's North Korea policy to its pre-Rangoon status and will help ease tensions on the Peninsula. South Korea recognizes the sanctions are not permanent and will not allow their removal to damage seriously its relations with Japan. [REDACTED]

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**EGYPT: Coptic Newspaper Reappears**

President Mubarak is trying to mend fences with the Christian Coptic community by allowing its weekly to be published for the first time since the late President Sadat banned it in 1981. The US Embassy says the issue last weekend featured articles by prominent Coptic politicians praising Mubarak for his program of political liberalization. It also carried a spiritual message from the Coptic Pope, who is still in government-imposed internal exile in a monastery near Cairo. [REDACTED]

**Comment:** Mubarak is gradually easing the restrictions on religious activity imposed by his predecessor. Sectarian tensions have decreased during his presidency, but he is still concerned about a possible renewal of strife between Muslims and Copts. The weekly publication was allowed to reappear only after the conclusion early this month of a trial of Islamic extremists implicated in disturbances following Sadat's assassination. Egyptian Copts will now expect Mubarak to release their Pope. [REDACTED]

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**In Brief****USSR**

- Reuter says **Soviet** Politburo member Romanov stated in Helsinki Sunday that Marshal Ogarkov "commands Soviet Union's largest western forces" . . . could refer to those in Western Theatre of Military Operations opposite NATO's Central Region . . . may reflect move toward new peacetime command structure he probably advocated as General Staff Chief.

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**Europe**

- **Dutch** officials worried leftwing opposition will exploit media attention to allegedly conflicting numbers of Soviet SS-20 missiles . . . could undermine credibility of US and **NATO** data . . . future Dutch decision to allow NATO cruise missiles tied directly to SS-20 deployment.
- **French** President Mitterrand has announced that he will introduce electoral reform bill in April . . . probably will feature proportional representation and redistricting designed to aid leftist and centrist candidates.

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**Africa**

- **Zaire** plans to begin withdrawing its 1,100-man force from **Chad** next week . . . will take at least a month . . . training of 600 Chadians in Zaire unaffected.
- Recent **Soviet** request to set up separate trade mission in **Zimbabwe** turned down . . . Harare did agree to permit trade officer and small staff to be attached to Soviet Embassy . . . request part of Moscow's longstanding effort to expand official presence.

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**Americas**

- **Soviet** officials again requesting permission to base TASS correspondent in **Uruguay** . . . Soviet offers of cultural agreement and briefings for officials before UN General Assembly ignored by Uruguayans . . . effort follows increase in Soviet-Uruguayan trade.
- **Peruvian** President Belaunde has named Army General to head Interior Ministry . . . experienced in counterinsurgency and should mollify military by strengthening that effort . . . new Minister also is presidential confidant . . . further diminishes probability of coup before national elections next April.


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
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


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
**Middle East**

— **Jordan's** King Hussein going to **Iraq** today . . . probably will urge President Saddam Husayn to resume diplomatic relations with **Egypt** soon . . . King may be concerned that other Arab states have not backed his move toward Cairo. 

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— **Iran** most likely responsible for Friday's attack on a fully loaded liquid petroleum gas tanker near southern end of Persian Gulf . . . first time in war LPG tanker attacked. 


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— **Iraq** claims its aircraft attacked a ship south of Khark Island yesterday . . . strike follows apparent **Iranian** attack on tanker Friday. 

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
— **Israeli** consumer prices rose by record 21.4 percent in September . . . officials had predicted larger increase so reaction may be muted . . . wage increases of 17 percent on 1 November also will remove some sting. 

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— **Egypt** recently sold 19 older Soviet SU-7 fighter-bombers to **Iraq**. 


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 Cairo provided 35 MIG-21 and SU-7 aircraft to Iraq in 1982 . . . SU-7s likely to be used for training and reserve role. 

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**South Asia**

— Opposition parties firmly rejected **Bangladesh** President Ershad's plans for holding elections and ending martial law . . . large turnout for peaceful protests last Sunday was important show of opposition strength . . . protests will continue. 

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


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**Cuban Civilian and Military Advisory Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa**



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## Special Analysis

### CUBA-AFRICA:

#### Moves To Expand Presence

***President Castro's intensive courting of several African leaders over the past three months apparently is aimed at bolstering Havana's position in Africa and possibly at offsetting setbacks Havana may experience in southern Africa. These overtures, particularly to the leaders of Ghana and Burkina—formerly Upper Volta—during recent state visits to Cuba, may be designed to test their receptivity to closer relations with Havana that would involve a larger Cuban civilian or military advisory presence. The Castro regime probably recognizes, however, that France has a major stake in the area and that a sudden influx of Cuban advisers could cause problems for the host countries.***

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Castro accorded Burkinan Chief of State Sankara lavish attention during his recent visit to Cuba. Their discussions focused on expansion of Cuban medical, agricultural, and technical assistance programs. Havana's newly appointed Ambassador to Burkina is an expert on Cuban aid programs in Africa, and some Cuban construction and agricultural specialists arrived in Burkina last week.

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Ghanaian leader Rawlings was the highest ranking foreign representative at Cuba's 26 July celebrations and during his stay was decorated with Cuba's most prestigious medal.

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**Castro's Strategy**

Havana probably views closer ties to black African leaders as a way to influence Angolan and Mozambican positions in negotiations with South Africa. Castro is becoming increasingly concerned that the large Cuban military and civilian contingents in Angola and Mozambique eventually may have to be withdrawn, and his recent actions probably are designed to offset such major policy setbacks.

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Havana's fears of a forced retreat in southern Africa probably have been heightened by the ongoing negotiations announced last week to end hostilities between the Mozambican Government and the insurgents, supported until recently by South Africa.

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According to the US Embassy in Luanda, the Angolans also appear to be considering an eventual reduction of Cuba's role in their country. To limit the damage to Cuba's image resulting from a major withdrawal from southern Africa, Castro may urge other African nations to accept some Cuban advisers now based in Angola or Mozambique.

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**Havana's Prospects**

Havana probably will have increasing success placing civilian—and perhaps security—advisers in West Africa, particularly in Burkina and Ghana, where young revolutionary governments have voiced admiration for the Cuban revolutionary model and have emulated some aspects of it. The Cubans, however, probably do not want to jeopardize Western aid to these countries or upset their domestic stability. Castro is unlikely to ask them to accept Cuban combat troops, even if forced to make reductions in southern Africa.

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## Special Analysis

**USSR:**

### Macroparticle Weapons

***The Soviets are developing a completely new kind of device to destroy targets. Soviet research on electromagnetically launched streams of macroparticles may eventually be applied in developing air defense and space-based antisatellite and ballistic missile defense weapons. Laboratory research, apparently begun in the early 1960s, may possibly now be moving toward initiation of weapon development.***

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A Soviet scientist stated in 1982 that he had a "film depicting 80-kilometer-per-second impacts that the Soviet Army generals like to see." He disclosed that the USSR has conducted research using hot plasmas to accelerate particles for an experimental weapon that is "something like your Vulcan Phalanx"—the US Navy's conventional rapid-fire gun for close-in air defense.

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The open Soviet scientific literature indicates that the USSR has had an experimental "gun" since 1966 that shoots very fine heavy-metal particles—a macroparticle stream—at velocities of up to 68 kilometers per second in a vacuum. Experimental data from the open literature show that a macroparticle stream is roughly 10 times as effective as conventional warheads in destroying targets.

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Macroparticle streams differ significantly from the particle-beam weapons under investigation both in the US and in the USSR. Particle-beam weapons use subatomic or atomic particles that have been accelerated to near the velocity of light. Macroparticle stream devices would shoot much heavier particles at much lower velocities.

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### Weapons Potential

The status of Soviet efforts to exploit the technology for weapons development is not yet clear.

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The experiments have been conducted since the late 1960s by the Institute of High Temperatures and other organizations associated with directed energy and ballistic missile defense research. Space Research Institute Director Sagdeyev has an important role in these studies. He was a spokesman of a delegation of Soviet scientists who visited Washington this summer to make a case that the US Strategic Defense Initiative is "unworkable."

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Since 1981, the Soviets have been considering construction of a new institute 160 kilometers east of Moscow for work on macroparticle stream technology. In early March of last year, however, construction had been delayed until the government reviewed the project.

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The Soviet studies appear to be an extension of US ballistic missile defense research conducted between the late 1950s and the late 1960s involving the electrical explosion of materials. The experimental devices developed have been described by Soviet scientists and military writers as "electrocannons" that use a new principle for propelling projectiles to hypervelocities.

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Before the Soviets could field an effective macroparticle stream weapon, they would have to develop major components, including power supplies and fire-control systems suitable for a combat environment, and perform tests using a full-scale prototype. The Soviet research on the Phalanx-like weapon may be a step beyond laboratory research toward a large experimental or developmental weapon.


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The current development of the weapon possibly could lead to improved conventional air defense gun systems with extended ranges and able to engage tactical missiles. It eventually could also lead to a space-based ballistic missile defense and defensive weapons on satellites.

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